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The Architecture of Reason: The Structure and Substance of Rationality by
Robert Audi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. xvi +286. $19.95
(paper).
W. JAY WOOD, Wheaton College
Robert Audi’s book The Architecture of Reason offers an impressively
comprehensive and systematic account of the structure of rationality that
unifies the theoretical rationality of reason and the practical rationality of
action and desire. It draws together many of the themes Audi has developed in earlier works such as Action, Intention, and Reason (1993), and The
Structure of Justification (1993). Though the book covers a wide expanse of
philosophical terrain—e.g. contemporary epistemology, meta-ethics, and
moral psychology—it is nevertheless rich with examples and replete with
helpful, nuanced distinctions.
The first of three major sections contains chapters 1 and 2, in which
Audi develops a modest foundationalist account of theoretical rationality,
one of the twin pillars of his overall architectonic. The epistemic justification of particular beliefs, “focal rationality,” is a matter of a belief’s being
“amply well-grounded.” Adequate grounding arises either inferentially
from other beliefs or, in the case of basic beliefs, from ultimate experiential
sources such as perception, introspection, and memory. Structurally, rationality is hierarchical; substantively, it rests ultimately in experience. These
grounds are unified insofar as they tend toward the truth. Audi responds
to the dilemma famously posed by Wilfred Sellars for any such foundationalist account of justification. On Sellar’s view, the non-conceptual experience of, say, seeing a tree may not need justification, but neither can it
confer any, since only reasons (or propositions) can confer justification. In a
Reidian vein, Audi distinguishes between “citing a ground,” which does
require that we conceptualize our grounds, and the “fact that I see it” (p.
17). Experiences are not reasons for accepting basic beliefs—they needn’t
be conceptualized—but they may nevertheless serve as a kind of warrant.
Audi ‘s is a modest foundationalism as it allows the justification conferred
by experiential grounds to be overridable, variable in content among
believers, and coherence is allowed to play a role in the justification of
inferential beliefs (p. 30, 205).
In chapter 2, Audi distinguishes between a belief’s being justified and
rational. Rationality is more than mere absence of irrationality, but a matter
of “entitlement,” or “permissibility,” “roughly, consonance with reason”(p.
52). Any belief that is justified is also rational, but the converse is not true.
“[A] rational belief need not be justified, even if the person must have
some degree of justification for it” (p. 196). Consider Audi’s example of a
juror treated to mixed evidence, who nevertheless forms the belief that the
defendant is innocent. The evidence may be sufficient to entitle the juror to
this belief while not being sufficient to justify it.
Section II, containing chapters 3–6, offers an account of practical reason
that is structurally analogous to theoretic reason, containing elements corresponding to inferential and non-inferential beliefs. Practical reason is the
sort of reasoning we engage in to bring about certain goals or ends. If we
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act to bring about some end, this may be grounded in still another intermediary desire, but ultimately, all our actions, intentions, and desires are
grounded in intrinsic desires, which are the “unmoved movers” of practical rationality, themselves a response to the felt qualities of the experiences
we undergo. We want to swim on a hot day because of the intrinsic qualities associated with being in the water. So, foundational desires, like foundational beliefs, have their ultimate basis in features of our experiences.
Practical rationality depends crucially on theoretical rationality—but is not
reducible to it—for the reasoning we do to bring about our goals and purposes depends on its being guided by suitably rational means-end beliefs.
“Belief is the crucial connective tissue that links instrumental desires to
intrinsic desires on which they are based” (p. 76). So intentional actions
bear a structural analogy to inferential beliefs, as they too are based on reasons that explain them. The practical reasons arising out of our desires are
unified insofar as they lead us to goodness.
If intrinsic desires are desires for enjoyable experiences such as a cool
swim or a stirring symphony, does this raise the specter of egoism, of all my
action being ultimately grounded in my pleasure or enjoyment? Chapter 4
addresses this concern by crucially distinguishing between my joy being
grounded in the pleasurable qualities of the experience and its being
grounded in the fact that it is my experience, between wanting to experience
the qualities of a cool swim and wanting these qualities for oneself. Chapter
6 exploits this distinction. Assuming that others are equally capable of experiencing such pleasures, then they too can be equally rational in pursuing
them, and we are thereby given a reason to bring it about that the other
swims. Not only does Audi’s account avoid egoism, but he also argues that
altruism is rationally demanded by reason. Chapter 5 advances an objective account of practical reason, in contrast to Humean instrumentalism.
Reason is not merely the “scout and spy” of desire, as Hobbes once put it.
“Desire without belief has no direction” (p. 108); our instrumental desires
must ultimately meet the demands of practical reason.
Inasmuch as the experiential grounds undergirding Audi’s theory of
rationality are internalist and pluralist, he anticipates the charge that his
theory is relativistic. In chapter 7, Audi helpfully distinguishes between a
variety of different types of relativism, among them, genetic relativism,
conceptual relativism, doxastic relativism, and status relativism. While it is
true that the rationality of one’s beliefs and desires are relative to their
grounds, and that these grounds may be variable among persons (p. 174),
Audi nevertheless argues that this is compatible with the objective rationality of belief developed in the first chapters.
The book concludes in chapter 8 with an account of “global rationality,”
that displayed by fully rational persons who successfully integrate rational
belief with right action and desire. Globally rational people don’t necessarily
believe or desire precisely the same things, though there are common criteria
that globally rational people tend to satisfy. Such persons have integrated
beliefs and desires that reflect and are suitably responsive to experience and
reflection; they desire their own pleasure and happiness and, insofar as they
believe others’ experiences like their own, desire happiness and pleasure for
others; they are also moral and value some things as intrinsically good.

BOOK REVIEWS

383

Audi remarks that rationality “is a matter of cognitive traits, such as
good habits of observation and inference and a tendency to get one’s beliefs
into reflective equilibrium.” He also mentions, but doesn’t develop the way
“hatred or prejudice” may undermine rationality. Such talk is strongly suggestive of thinking about rationality and other intellectual goods in terms of
intellectual virtues. Audi, however, only alludes to this in a footnote. The
notion of intellectual virtues and vices would not only help to amplify his
account of globally rational persons, it would give more prominent attention to the contributions of the will toward the overall rationality of our
beliefs and desires. If the will, in its conative aspect, is the seat of one’s
desires, concerns, affections, its role is crucial for Audi’s account of rational
beliefs, desires, and emotions. Consider his example of the juror who
believes rationally in the face of divided evidence. Suppose the juror is a
bigot and the defendant a person of color. It is plausible to think that the
state of the juror’s will influences the way he assesses the probative force of
the evidence, and thus what he is rational in believing. Given the scope of
book, it is, perhaps, unfair to object that Audi doesn’t take on still more
material. And elsewhere, in “Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief,” Audi
does link intellectual virtues and rationality more directly.
In sum, The Architecture of Rationality clearly exemplifies the intellectual
excellences it analyzes and recommends. Though wide ranging, it is nevertheless subtle, compactly written, and will repay the close reading and rereading it so richly deserves.
Reading Hume’s Dialogues: A Veneration for True Religion by William Lad
Sessions, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002. Pp. X + 281. $49.95
(cloth), $24.95 (paper).
KEVIN SCHILBRACK, Wesleyan College
This is the first book length commentary on David Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. It is welcome in the first place simply because
William Lad Sessions is a meticulous reader, and his observations are consistently insightful and profitable. But the approach of this book is distinctive, moreover, in that it pursues what Sessions calls an internal reading of
the Dialogues. “External” interpretations use tools drawn from outside the
text itself. They are external, for example, in that they address some contemporary philosophical question that was not Hume’s, taking the form of
what Sessions calls “mining operations” that extract pithy propositions or
argumentative ore while ignoring the literary matrix from which they arise.
Or they may be external in the sense that they read the Dialogues in terms of
some other extra-textual context, such as Hume’s life and interests, or eighteenth-century intellectual movements, or the history of skepticism. In contrast, Sessions pursues an internal reading that resolutely interprets the text
on its own terms, tracing the connections between the individual parts of
Hume’s book and supposing (defeasibly) that the work forms a unity in
which nothing is extraneous. By taking this approach, Sessions gives attention not only to the arguments made by the characters, but also to “seeing

